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1.Introduction
Within the international economic scenario of our days, one feature that is common
to many countries, especially those that are in the process of development, is the existence
of measures that restrict trade and the foreign exchange market. As a result of this
situation, black markets arise in which the foreign currency market enjoys a position of
prominence. The existence of such markets, in which the exchange rate is almost always
higher than the official exchange rate, gives rise to a premium in the sale and  purchase of
currency. This normally positive premium strongly induces manipulation of reports of
international trade invoicing.
Exporters can boost their profits by underinvoicing and later on selling the
currency corresponding to the underinvoiced amount on the black market, thereby
obtaining a greater amount of local money for the same transaction. In the case of
importers, the stimulus is in favour of overinvoicing the imports. Indeed, what happens is
that when the importer overinvoices and sells on the black market the amount
corresponding to the overinvoiced portion, at the close of the operation he manages to
spend less local currency for the same import. It should be noted that, insofar as they are
illegal practices, both over-and undervoicing are subject to legal charges. These practices
are therefore profitable when the black market-premium is greater than the risk premium
in question.
This paper tries to ascertain the effect of the premium on the exchange-rate black
market on this type of procedure. The paper is organized in the following way: the second
section develops the question of under-or over-invoicing exports and imports within the
context of the theory of choice involving risk by using an adaptation of a model
[Arrow(1974, p.98-109)] of choices between risky and secure assets. In the third section
are shown the results of an econometric model that seeks to investigate the empirical
evidence for the Brazilian economy during the recent past with regard to this topic. In the
fourth section are given the main conclusions reached by the paper.
2. The Theory of Choice Involving Risk and Under-invoicing of Exports
The practice of an accounting report at dissonace with the true transaction is
always a possibility whenever an economic agent is compelled by some mechanism to sell
his endowments - or production - at a lower value than what another market could offer.
A typical case of this procedure is seen in the overinvoicing of imports and
underinvoicing of exports. If  F is the price at which the Central Bank buys or sells foreign
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money and F(1+P), P>0, the black-market price, it obviously becomes advantageous,
when other factors in the analysis are disregarded, to buy foreign money at F and sell at
F(1+P) (overinvoicing of imports), which is economically similar to not selling at F and
selling at F(1+P) (underinvoicing of exports).
What can offset this type of procedure are the risks involved when the Central
Bank discovers fraud, and the consequences of this discovery. In attempting to formalize
the decision-making mechanism on the part of some agent as regards his involvement in
this type of practice, we shall use the following hypotheses:
a) The agent maximizes his expected utility from his income Y. This income
derives from his exports carried out during a certain period of time and expressed in
foreign currency.1
b) The agent must choose how much of his income (R=Y=B) he will sell to the
Central Bank at price F (including possible direct or indirect taxation). The remaining
portion B will be sold on the black market at price F(1+P) + ε , P (the black-market
premium) being given by (FB - F)/F, with FB translating the quotation in domestic
currency of the foreign exchange rate quoted on the black market. The random variable ε
represents the random loss arising from the risk involved in the accounting fraud.
c) The black premium (P) is constant and independent of the agent's decisions. This
is equivalent to supposing that the agent is a "small"component of this market.
Given these hypotheses, our problem is reduced to finding the value of B in the
interval 0≤  B ≤  Y, which maximizes the expected utility from income:
G(B) = E U (YF + B (FP + ε ))   (1)
For this, we differentiate expression (1) twice, and obtain:
G'(B) = E(FP+ε ) U'(YF+B(FP+ε ))
G"(B) = E(FP+ε )2 U"(YF+B(FP+ε ))
If the agent is risk-lover, U"(.) is by definition positive and function G(B) convex
in B. In this case, the whole of income Y will be sold to the Central Bank if G(0)>G(Y),
or, on the black market when G(Y)>G(0). If G(0) = G(Y), the agent is indifferent as to one
option or the other. In either case, no diversification is possible. The agent will sell all his
income on one or the other market.
Given indifference to risk, we can take U(Y)=Y. Maximization of (1) will therefore
have B=0 for a solution, if Eε  + FP < 0, or B=Y, if Eε +FP>0. In the case where Eε +FP=0,
the agent is indifferent to any value of B in the interval [0,Y].
It can be observed that under these two possible attitudes towards risk, there are no
situations of a single optimal point that involves diversification, that is, compatible with a
procedure by which part of the income in foreign currency is sold on the black market and
another part sold to the Central Bank. This type of solution only occurs when the agent is
supposed to be risk-averse. In this case, the function to be minimized (G(B)) is concave
and able to produce the three cases illustrated in Figure 1.
In Figure 1(a) the agent will sell nothing on the black market. One necessary and
sufficient condition for this to occur is that G'(0)=E(FP+ε ) U'(YF)<0, or equivalently
(since U'(RF)>0), E(FP+ε )<0. This equation shows that the risk-averse individual will sell
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nothing on the black market if (and only if) expected amount of gain compared to the
Central Bank (which is risk-free) is negative.
In Figure 1(b) all of the revenue in foreign currency is sold on the black market.
This occurs when
G'(Y) = E(FP + ε ) U'(Y(F(1+P) + ε )) > 0
Finally, Figure 1(c) presents the most interesting case, in which the allocation of
revenue is diversified, one part Be being sold on the black market, and the remaining part
Re=Y-BE) to the Central Bank. This takes place when E(FP+ε )>0 and G'(Y)<0. The point
of equilibrium Be is thus determined by the equation:
H(Be, FY, FP) = E(FP+ε ) U'(FY+Be (FP+ε )) = 0 (2)
This equation can be solved, and we may write Be as a  function of FY and FP.
That is:
Be = b(FY, FP) (3)
or:
Re = Y-Be = Y-b(FY,FP) = r(Y,FY,FP) (4)
where Re is registered value of exports in Central Bank accounts.
We will show in the Appendix that if we suppose an absolute risk-aversion
coefficient that decreases or is constant with income, it can be guaranteed that an increase
in the exporter's total invoicing in domestic currency resulting from an increase in the
initial invoicing in foreign currency, or from a devaluation of the exchange rate F, will
lead to a rise in the underinvoiced total. In symbols:
sgn
B
FY
sgn A Y
e ∂
∂
⋅ ′ < () 0 (5)
where A(Y) = - U" (Y)/U'(Y) is the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion.
Under this same hypothesis (A'(Y) ≤  0), it can also be guaranteed (see Appendix)
that a rise in the black-market premium (P) will lead to an increase in the underinvoiced
total:
∂
∂
B
FP
e
> 0 (6)
In the case where A'(Y)>0, this will occur if and only if (see Appendix):
EU Y F B F P B
H
FY
ee ′ ++ + > (( ) ) ε
∂
∂
0 (7)
Empirical observation of cases of underinvoicing of exports bears out several of
the possibilities we have mentioned up to now. The simple act of smuggling is equivalent
to a corner solution in which B=Y, in other words, all the exchange revenue obtained is4
destined for the black market. This would be compatible with any of the three attitudes
towards risk: propensity (with G(Y) > G(0)), indiference (if FP+Eε  >0), or aversion to risk
(if G'(Y) > 0).
Total absence of any type of underinvoicing, which would be translated by Be=0,
that is, by the sale of all exchange revenue to the Central Bank, also fits both into the
propensity case (with G(0)>G(Y)), the indifference case (if FP+Eε  < 0), and the risk-
aversion case (if G'(0)<0).
Intermediary behaviour, however, by which underinvoicing means that a part of
the total amount received in foreign currency is sold to the Central bank and another part
on the black market is only compatible (in the absence of other cost, as is supposed in this
model) with the hypothesis of risk-aversion. In principle this is done by means of the
difference between the price registered in the Central Bank accounts and what is actually
received for each export unit. Furthermore, if underinvoicing is not an inferior good, that
is, one that increases with the exporter's revenue, this is a sign that the latter demonstrates
an absolute risk-aversion coefficient that decreases with income. In this case it can be
guaranteed that a rise in the black-market premium would lead to an increase in the
portion of the total revenue from exports that is designed to supply to the black market.
3.Underinvoicing of Exports and Overinvoicing of Imports: Empirical Evidence
We next present two rather simple models on which we can base an analysis of the
hypothesis that the premium on the black-market dollar stimulates underinvoicing of
exports and overinvoicing of imports.
In the case of exports, we admit that the export figure R officially registered in
Central Bank is equal to the total value of export Y minus the amount B of foreign
currency sold in the black market. The export figure in equal to the dollar price index (π *)
of Brazilian goods times the exported quantum (y):
Y = π * . y (8)
We assume that exported quantity y is a function of the effective real exchange rate
e, the level of world income q, and the rate of utilization of the domestic productive
capacity u. That is:
y = y(e, q, u) (9)
By combining (4), (8) and (9) we obtain the following equation for the registered
value of exports:
R R equP =
++ + − − (* ,,,,) π (10)
where the signs below each variable indicate the expected signs of the partial derivatives
of this function.
The empirical research that is reported in this paper made use of quarterly data
from the 1979/85 period. The year of 1986 was disregarded, being an atypical year
because of the well-known effects of the cruzado Plan [see Barbosa, Faro and Brandão
(1989)].
The 1979/85 period was characterized by the high rates fetched by the dollar
premium on the black market, defined as the percentual difference between the exchange
rate on the black market and the official market rate. yable 1 shows the evolution of the5
dollar premium during the period 1978-I/1985-IV. This period reveals not only high rates
for the premium, but also a great variability, as can easily be seen by examining the values
in Table 1.
Our study of exports concentrates on exports of industrialized products. The idea is
that the practice of underinvoicing must be more common for this type of merchandise,
which is characterized by a great heterogeneity of specifications and prices, than for
agricultural products, which, besides being more homogeneous, mostly present prices that
are quoted in international commodity markets. The dollar values for exports of
industrialized products are those published in the Bulletin issued by the Central Bank of
Brazil.
From the practical point of view, the estimation of an equation with quarterly data
poses some problems for dynamic specification, because theory does not usually indicate
the lags involved in the different variables. On the other hand, the use of variables with
lags generally brings problems of multicollinearity, which limits and complicates
empirical investigation. Thus, we start from an unrestricted autoregressive distributed lag
model [see Hendry, Pagan and Sargan (1984)] of equation (10). That is:
RL R L Z tt j j t t
j
=+ + −
=  αβ ε () () 1
1
5
(11)
where α (L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L(L Xt = Xt-1) of order mo, β j (L) is a
polynomial of order mi, ξ t is assumed to be white noise and the variables Zjt are given by:
ZZ e Z q Z u Z P tt t t ttt t tt 12 34 5 == == = π
*, , , , . This model is usually represented by the
symbol AD(mo, m1, ..., m5).
The variable et is equal to the product of the dollar price of the exports, by the
subsidy rate (1+s) and by the nominal exchange rate, divided by the wholesale price index
of Getulio Vargas Foundation. The price index for exports of the transformation
industries, which is published in the Conjuntura Econômica review, was used as a proxy
for the export price in dollars.
In the case of subsidies, we made an approximation because of the lack of quartely
data for these times. As a starting point we used the indexes of annual subsidies calculated
by Moreira and Baumann (1986), and adopted the hypothesis that the subsidy structure
remains constant throughout the year.
For world income we adopted as a proxy the quantum index of world imports
calculated from data published in International Financial Statistics.
In the case of the variable utilization of installed capacity, we opted for the index
for utilization of installed capacity calculated by Getulio Vargas Foundation and published
in Conjuntura Econômica review.
Table 2 contains the estimated parameters of a restricted specification of equation
(11), all the variables being in natural logarithms, except for the intercept and the seasonal
dummies for the first and second quarters. The third quarter dummy was not significant,
and thus it was removed the regression.
With regard to the variables in (10), all the variables have the expected signs and
except for the variable for price of exports in dollars, are statistically significant at the 5%
level.
The coefficient of the price index for exports in dollars is not significantly different
from zero from the statistical point of view. This result led us to look closely at the
behavior of this index during the period analysed. The variability of the index is quite
small and its value relatively stable. Consequently, the variation of the dollar value of6
exports in this period is due primordially to the variation of the exported quantum. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the price index in dolars did not affect the dollar value of the
exports.
The conclusion reached by various pieces of research in Brazil as to the main
variables that affect exports of manufactured goods is repeated here, since the real
exchange rate, world income, and level of utilization of capacity are all significant and of
similar magnitude to other studies already carried out on the subject of Brazil's economy.
The dollar premium on the black market has a negative effect on the dollar value of
exports and is significantly different from zero. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis of overinvoicing of exports.
The estimate given in Table 2 resulted from a restricted version of (11). The lags
with respect to world income and the dolar premium on the black market are of two
quarters, while the other variables have no delay. The lagged dependent variable was
included, but it was removed based on an F test. Table 2 also reports the values obtained
for several specifications tests. LA(4,14) is an F-version of  Lagrange multiplier test for
4th order residual autocorrelation; NORM is a test for normality of residuals based on
skewness and kustosis and follows a chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom;
HET (1,24) is an F-version of Lagrange multiplier test for heteroscedasticity;  and RESET
(1,12) is an F-version of Ramsey's (1969) test for functional form mis-specification.2 None
of the test statistics indicate any serious mis-specification of the eqiation reported in Table
2.
In the case of imports, we assume that the import figure R officially registered in
Central Bank is equal to the total value of imports plus the amount B of foreign currency
sold in the black market. The import figure is equal to the dollar price index of foreign
goods (π ) times the imported quantum (m):
y = π . m (12)
In the imports model we use the traditional equation of imports, in which the
imported quantum is a function of the real cost of imports (e*) and of the real income level
of the economy (q*). That is:
m = m (e*, q*) (13)
The quantity imported and the real income of the economy vary in the same
direction  (/ ) ∂ ∂ mq ∗> 0 , whereas the real cost  of imports and the imported quantum
must be negatively correlated (∂ m/∂ e* < 0).
By combining equations (12), (13) and (3), the following equation is reached for
the registered value of imports in dollars:
R R eq P =
+− + + ( , *, *, ) π (14)
where, once again, the signs below each variable indicate the expected signs of the
respective partial derivatives.
The import data used for the empirical analysis, with all the variables in their
natural logaritms, were total imports except for oil and wheat. The exclusion of these two
products is reasonable, given the specific characteristics that define the process of their
importation by the government.
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As for the real exchange rate et
*, we adopted the hypothesis that the tariff structure
did not alter significantly during the period. The real exchange rate is therefore equal to
the product of the nominal exchange rate by the import price index in dollars (except for
oil and wheat), divided by the wholesale price index of Getulio Vargas Foundation. The
dollar price index for imports was obtained directly from the Getulio Vargas Foundation.
The domestic income variable is given by the gross domestic product (GDP) of the
country. Although the publication of statistics related to the GDP in quarterly terms is
common in developed countries, it is not practised by official organs in Brazil. We
therefore resort to a paper by Lopes and Modiano (1985) which includes estimates for the
quarterly GDP.
As in the case of exports, we start from an unrestricted AD((mo, m1, ...,m4) model:
RL R L x tt
j
jj t t =+ + −
=  γδ η () () 1
1
4
(15)
where γ (L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L of order mo, δ j (L) is a polynomial of
order mj,  η t is a white noise random variable, and the variables xjt are given by:
xx e x q tt t ttt 12 3 === π ,,
**  and x4t = Pt.
Table 3 presents the results obtained in estimating the parameters of a restricted
version of equation (15) by the method of ordinary least squares. The coefficients of the
real exchange rate, real income, and price index in dollars all show the expected signs and
are significant from the statistical point of view. The dummy variable for the second
quarter was significant, whereas the others dummies were insignificants. The registered
value of imports with four lags also entered as an explicative variable.
The estimate of the coefficient with two lags of the dollar premium on the black
market has a negative sign, whereas the coefficient for three lags has a positive sign. The
sum of these two coefficients is positive (0.007) and its standard error is 0.026. Therefore,
the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is equal to zero can not be rejected. Thus,
the hypothesis that the dollar premium on the black market stimulated overinvoicing of
imports would be rejected. Table 3 presents also the results of several specification tests.
Again, none of the statistics point out mis-specification of the estimated equation.
4. Conclusions
This paper has presented a theoretical model as well as an empirical analysis of the
question of under-or over-invoicing of exports and imports, where the black-market
premium on the foreign exchange rate is supposed to play a role in this process. It reached
the following conclusions:
i) Empirical evidence for the period 1979-IV/1985-IV in exports of Brazilian
manufactured goods is consistent with the hypothesis that the dollar premium on the
black market stimulated the practice of underinvoicing exports;
ii) The hypothesis that the premium on the black market caused overinvoicing of total
Brazilian imports, excluding petrol and wheat, is rejected for the period 1979-IV/1985-
IV;
iii) The existence of a registered value of exports sensitive with respect to the black
premium renders the empirical results compatible with the theoretical developments
carried out in the second section of the paper. if we suppose risk aversion and risk-
aversion coefficient that decreases with income, this implies an incresa in underinvoicing8
of exports when the premium on the black market rises. This being the behavior of the
economic agents, it can also be claimed that when the total initial revenue in local
currency derived from exports is increased, whether due to a devaluation of the exchange
rate or to an increase in revenue from exports, there will also be an increase in the
amount destined to be sold on the black market.
Appendix
Proposition I - Let 
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Proof - To begin, let us note that from equation (2)
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With  ∂ ∂ HBG B
ee /( ) = ′′ < 0, it is concluded that ∂ Be/∂ FY will have the same
sign as ∂ H/∂ FY, the same happening with ∂ Be/∂ FP and ∂ H/∂ FP.
Proposition II - If 
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H
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> 0, then 
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> 0. On the other hand if 
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Proof - From equation (2):
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or again, from (A.1) and (A.2):
∂
∂
ε
∂
∂
H
FP
EU Y F B F P B
H
FY
ee = ′ ++ + (( ) ) (A.3)9
As U'(YF + Be (FP + ε )) is necessarily positive, since it represents the marginal
utility of income, the sign of 
∂
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H
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 will be positive if 
∂
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H
FY
> 0, and may be positive,
negative or null if 
∂
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< 0.
Proposition III - The partial derivative 
∂
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H
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 will have the opposite sign to that of A'(Y):
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Proof - Let us start by taking A'(Y) < 0. In this case, for any value of (FP+ε ),
() ( () ) () ( ) FP A YF B FP FP A YF
e ++ + < + ε ε ε
By multiplying both terms by the negative value of U' (YF + Be (FP + ε )) we get:
() ( () ) ( ) () ' ( () ) FP U YF B FP A YF FP U YF B FP
ee + ′′ ++ > − + ++ ε ε ε ε
Taking the mathematical expectation,
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But from equation (2), the second member of the above equation is equal to zero,
which gives us:
∂
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A similar argument could be used to show that 
∂
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< 0  i f   A ' ( Y )  <  0 ,  a n d
∂
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= 0 if A'(Y) = 0.
Proposition IV - If the absolute risk-aversion coefficient decreases or is constant with
income, then an increase (decrease) in the exporter's total invoicing in domestic currency
resulting from an increase (decrease) in the initial invoicing in foreign currency, or from a
devaluation of the exchange rate F, will lead to a rise (decline) in the undervoiced total.
Proof - By combining Proposition I and II we obtain (5).
Proposition V - An increase (decrease) in the black market premium will always lead to an
increase (decrease) in the total invoiced amount if the absolute risk-aversion coeficient is a
constant or decreasing function with respect to income. In the case where A'(Y) > 0, this
will occur if and only if (7) holds.10
Proof - By combining Propositions I, II, and III, it is easy to see that if A'(Y) > 0, then
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> 0. By Proposition (III) when  ′ >< AY
H
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() , 00
∂
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. Therefore 
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> 0 if and only
if (7) holds, as can be sen by looking at (A.3).
TABLE 1
The Dollar Premium on the Black Market
Quarters
Year
I II III IV
Annual
Average
1978 17,2 10,9 20,7 24,3 18,3
1979 16,3 20,0 14,6 23,1 18,5
1980   8,5 11,2 17,5 12,0 12,3
1981   2,3 11,7 24,1 27,4 16,4
1982 35,3 38,0 54,6 69,3 49,3
1983 69,7 52,5 69,3 43,3 58,7
1984 18,5   7,4 14,1 17,5 14,4
1985 15,3 18,1 31,8 34,5 24,911
TABLE 2
The Dollar Premium and Underinvoicing of Exports
Constant Dummy 1 Dummy 2 π t
* et qt-2 ut Pt-2
1.584
(0,506)
-0.074
(-1.370)
-0.142
(-2.552)
0.095
(0.305)
0.893
(2.574)
2.763
(6.341)
-3.022
(-5.708)
-0.088
(-2.610)
R2=0.85 D.W.=1,57 LA (4,14) = 0.74 HET (1,24) = 0.01  σ  = 0.10
R
2 = 0.79 F(7,18)=14.46 NORM{χ 2(2)}=0.65 RESET (1,17) = 0.35 F(10,8)=
0,88
Notes: 1) Figures between parentheses are student t statistics. 2) Method used: ordinary least squares12
TABLE 3
The Dollar Premium and Overinvoicing of Imports
Constant Dummy
2
Rt-4 π t π t-1 π t-3 π t-4 et
* qt − 1
* P(-2) P(-3)
-21.086
(-7.017)
0.215
(4.469)
0.384
(4.942)
1.625
(3.887)
0.848
(2.517)
0.939
(1.417)
-0.521
(-2.220)
-0.939
(-2.886)
2.963
(6.204)
-0.065
(-2.307)
0.072
(2.467)
R2 = 0.97 D.W.1.90 LA (4,9) = 2.81 HET (1,22) = 0.07  σ  = 0.07
R
2 =0.94 F(10,13)=37.19 NORM[χ 2 (2)] = 0.89 RESET(1,12) =
8.45
F(9,4) = 2.23
Notes: 1) Figures between parentheses are student t statistics. 2) Method used: ordinary least squares.1314
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